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documents, interviewed hundreds of witnesses, visited scores of bombed sites,
and then concluded that strategic bombing had indeed been a decisive factor in
the Allied victory, as they reported.
Alas, such a conclusion is unacceptable
to Gentile. He must find nefarious
schemes and schemers, and so he repeatedly questions the motives and veracity
of the participants. For example, when
General Curtis LeMay testified before
Congress that he did not believe airpower
could “win the war” and that a balanced
mix of land, sea, and air forces was necessary for victory, Gentile dismisses his
statement as a “shrewd and bureaucratically astute” tactic to manipulate his civilian superiors.
The USSBS has been controversial ever
since it was written. Small wonder—attempting to measure the effects of strategic bombing in World War II was a
massive undertaking, conducted at a time
when the techniques of systems analysis
were in their infancy. Gentile finds it
troubling that survey members were not
in total agreement. This should hardly
come as a surprise. If the unfolding of
historical events were simple and uncontested, our libraries would be far smaller.
His concluding chapter, dealing with the
survey that analyzed the air campaign of
the Persian Gulf War, is less tendentious.
Here again, however, the author presents
little that is new, and, more importantly,
he does not attempt to address the book’s
ostensible focus—the efficacy of strategic
bombing.
Measuring the effectiveness of strategic
air attack is one of the greatest challenges
facing military planners today. It is an
enormously complex and difficult problem that defies easy solution. Yet as
airpower becomes increasingly dominant
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as a foreign-policy tool, such measurement is essential. This poorly reasoned
and highly parochial book will not help
us find answers to that pressing need, nor
will it foster understanding among the
services.
PHILLIP S. MEILINGER

Science Applications International Corporation
McLean, Va.

Jordan, Robert S. Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme Commander—Airman, Strategist, Diplomat.
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000. 329pp. $49

Lauris Norstad was a major Air Force
leader during the defining years of the
Cold War, and except for Dwight Eisenhower, he was the most prominent of all
the Supreme Allied Commanders Europe
(SACEUR) since that position was established in early 1951. Surprisingly, up to
now, nothing definitive had been written
on his role as SACEUR. Robert Jordan, a
professor at the University of New Orleans and an authority on Nato, has filled
that gap.
Norstad grew up in a small town in Minnesota and graduated from West Point in
the class of 1930. Transferring to the Air
Corps in 1931, he was one of that relatively small group of regular-officer aviators who provided air force leadership
during World War II. When the war began, Major Norstad was serving on an air
staff in Washington, D.C. He came to the
attention of General Henry “Hap” Arnold,
who headed what had become in June
1941 the Army Air Forces. In 1942 Arnold
established a select group of young officers, the brightest he could find, to work
in his immediate office. Norstad was one
of them—he was on the way up.
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That summer Arnold sent Norstad to
England to serve as operations chief of
the Twelfth Air Force—Eisenhower’s air
arm for Operation TORCH, the November 1942 invasion of North Africa. In his
war memoir, Eisenhower had this to say
about Norstad: “[Norstad was] a young
air officer who so impressed me by his
alertness, grasp of problems, and personality that I never thereafter lost sight of
him.” Before long, Brigadier General
Norstad was operations chief for the
Allied Air Forces Mediterranean. In the
fall of 1944, Arnold returned Norstad to
Washington, D.C., as chief of staff of the
Twentieth Air Force, charged with
planning the strategic bombing campaign
against Japan. By war’s end, Major General Lauris Norstad, though not one of
the top combat heroes of the Army Air
Forces, was definitely one of its top
comers.
From the end of World War II until the
Korean War, the leadership of the reduced American armed forces struggled
with new questions. Two of the most important were the role of nuclear weapons
and how the U.S. military should be organized. With Eisenhower serving as
chief of staff of the U.S. Army, and
Norstad his deputy for operations (G-3),
Norstad was involved in both issues, particularly in developing the compromises
that led to the 1947 legislation resulting
in the National Military Establishment,
and ultimately to a separate Department
of the Air Force. Subsequently, Lieutenant General Norstad, operations chief for
the Air Force, played a major role in organizing the Berlin Airlift during the crisis
of 1948–49. In the fall of 1950 he became
commander of U.S. Air Forces Europe.
The main focus of Jordan’s book concerns Norstad’s subsequent twelve years
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of service in Europe, in particular the last
six, when he served as SACEUR.
The author analyzes in detail three major
issues confronted by Norstad that were
most significant: the role and employment of nuclear weapons in alliance defense, the Berlin crises of 1958–59 and
1961–62, and the problem of balancing
SACEUR’s roles as both an international
and an American forces commander.
The nuclear weapons issue was complicated by the fact that the British had their
own weapons, the French wanted theirs,
and the West Germans, having none,
were not quite certain they would be fully
defended if the alliance had no recourse
other than nuclear war. As Jordan demonstrates, Norstad was an able diplomat
who succeeded in developing an alliance
consensus on the role of nuclear weapons
in deterring the Soviet Union.
Since Berlin was inside the Soviet-occupied
zone of Germany, it became an ideal location for the Soviets to apply pressure
on the alliance—by denying, or threatening to deny, access to the city. Though
the issues were extremely complex, in a
clear and interesting fashion Jordan explains Norstad’s role as diplomat and
strategist in meeting Nikita Khrushchev’s
challenge.
It is in his examination of SACEUR’s
conflicting roles as an American and simultaneously an international commander
that Jordan makes his major contribution.
This issue came to a head for Norstad
with the arrival of the Kennedy administration in 1961, with its secretary of defense, Robert Strange McNamara. The
substantive issue was the nature, role,
and control of nuclear weapons as an element of Nato strategy. The process issue
was that the administration found it hard
to accept SACEUR’s dual role, tending to
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view Norstad as an American commander
only. The details cannot be developed
within the confines of a review, but in the
end Norstad was forced to walk the
plank—though the final jump was delayed for a period of two months by the
administration’s need for his assistance
during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.
Robert Jordan has produced an important work that is thoroughly researched,
nicely written, and most insightful. No
doubt it will be the definitive biography
of Lauris Norstad—Cold War airman,
strategist, and diplomat. The book will
also be of interest to those involved in the
study of civil-military relations, especially
in these years of increased commitment
of U.S. military forces in multinational or
international interventions.
DOUGLAS KINNARD

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Retired
Emeritus Professor of Political Science
University of Vermont

Crane, Conrad C. American Airpower Strategy in
Korea, 1950–1953. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas,
2000. 252pp. $35

Conrad Crane is a research professor for
military strategy at the Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, and
formerly a professor of military history at
the U.S. Military Academy. Crane previously wrote Bombs, Cities, and Civilians:
American Airpower Strategy in World War
II (1993), which is widely respected for
its rich and adroit analysis. American
Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950–1953 is
a comprehensive, thoroughly researched
treatment of the many issues that the
newly constituted U.S. Air Force faced as
a result of having to fight its first war as
an independent service—a war that it
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was not doctrinally or materially
prepared for, and that the service had
neither anticipated nor especially wanted
to fight. Crane logically takes the reader
through the war from the prehostilities
period, which generally set the stage for
the limited character of the war and specifically established the character of the
Air Force’s contribution; the opening
moves and initial setbacks; the miraculous
end-around at Inchon and subsequent
march to the Yalu; the bitter winter of
1950–51; and finally to the stalemate
along the thirty-eighth parallel.
Crane analyzes the performance of the Air
Force in conducting air warfare in a regional, limited conflict at a time when the
service was focused on strategic nuclear war
and restricted by government policy as to
the resources that could be allocated to Korea. It was a condition that the Air Force
would again confront in Vietnam. The Korean War presented the Air Force with a
myriad of challenges, not the least of which
was the attempt to meet high expectations
for operational effectiveness based on results obtained during World War II.
However, the very nature of the new conflict constrained that effectiveness. A classic example of the limited nature of the
Korean War was the prohibition against
crossing the Yalu River to engage enemy
forces or interdict lines of communication. Crane also takes great pains to highlight how austere were the resources
made available to the Korean area of operations, because the Air Force was required to maintain the bulk of the active
component in a ready status to respond
to other worldwide threats. This requirement was the catalyst for many issues
that arose during the conduct of the war,
among them the decision to recall to active duty large numbers of aircrewmen
who had served in World War II and
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